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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE CRAFT OF DUE PROCESS

KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL*
Professor Israel’s aim in telling the story of the Supreme Court’s
development of interpretative guidelines for due process “is to provide a
springboard for further exploration of the appropriate role of free-standing due
process . . . .”1 He has certainly achieved his goal, offering as he does in this
year’s Childress Lecture an array of due process issues for lawyers, judges and
academics to examine.
One such question that recurred to me as I read Professor Israel’s article is
how receptive the Supreme Court’s conception of due process is to reform of
our criminal justice system by means other than constitutional amendment. In
determining whether a particular procedural right is so fundamental as to be
protected by due process, for example, the Court has offered alternative
reference points. As Professor Israel notes, the Court at times has suggested
that the proper frame of reference for determining the fundamental nature of a
procedural right is a broad one, the universality of the right to all civilized
systems.2 At other times the Court has suggested a narrower frame of
reference for determining this issue, whether the right has been recognized
within the Anglo-American common law tradition.3 In 1968, the Court in
Duncan v. Louisiana4 appeared to have resolved this ambiguity by adopting
the narrower of these standards—”whether . . . a procedure is necessary to an
Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty”5—as the appropriate touchstone
for due process analysis. To what degree does this choice ossify American
criminal procedure? Does the choice of an Anglo-American standard for due
process analysis effectively insulate a troubled American criminal justice

* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. The author thanks Melvin
Durchslag, Lewis Katz, and Robert Lawry for providing helpful comments on a draft of this
article.
1. Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process in Criminal Procedure: The Supreme
Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 305-06 (2001).
2. Id. at 352-55.
3. Id.
4. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
5. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 n.14.
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system from reforms inspired by continental systems outside the AngloAmerican tradition?6
Another important question Professor Israel’s article suggests is whether
the Supreme Court’s conception of due process and other constitutional
criminal procedure rights as developed during the past century is compatible
with the volume of offenses and offenders currently processed by the
American criminal justice system. That conception adopts the view that each
criminal defendant is entitled to an elaborate constellation of rights such as
trial by jury, confrontation of witnesses and protection against selfincrimination. The elaborate nature of this conception, though, seems out of
touch with the mass production quality of our criminal justice system, which
recently reached a new record of incarcerating more than two million people.7
As this figure suggests, providing an elaborate set of rights to each defendant
would be extremely costly. Instead of fulfilling the promise of the Supreme
Court’s conception of criminal procedure rights, our criminal justice system
threatens and entices ninety-four percent of defendants8 into accepting a much
cruder, simpler and less costly procedure: the negotiated guilty plea, which has
been aptly described as “a capitulation to the conditions of mass society.” 9 In
6. Professor William Pizzi has recently argued in favor of continentally inspired reform of
the American criminal justice system. See WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH (1999).
Professor Pizzi argues that the Supreme Court’s current constitutional doctrines do not
necessarily bar such reforms. Id. at 230-31. He notes that:
[S]ome of the Supreme Court’s decisions are not quite the barriers to reform they might
initially appear to be. The Court has indicated in some of its opinions that it would reach
a different decision if a legislature were to put forward an alternative scheme. To give an
important example, in Duncan v. Louisiana, which imposed the requirement of jury trial
on the states, the Court conceded in a footnote that “[a] criminal process which was fair
and equitable but used no juries is easy to imagine. It would make use of alternative
guarantees and protections which would serve the same purposes that the jury serves in
the English and American systems.” The Court had no option but to take this position
because to insist that the lack of a jury made a system fundamentally unfair would
condemn almost every western trial system in whole or part as well as international courts
of justice which have never used juries. But the Court went on to note that “no American
System has undertaken to construct such a system.” Here is an opening for a major
reform in the states that might permit us to move away from juries in their present form.
We could compensate for the move by adding other guarantees of fairness, such as mixed
panels, reasoned decisions, broad appellate review, and so on.
Id. at 231 (citations omitted).
7. ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1999, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 1 (2000). The total number of Americans in jails and prisons in
the United States reached 2,026,596 for the first time at the end of 1999. Id.
8. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1998, at
2 (2000).
9. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (“[P]lea
bargaining . . . is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be neither
encouraged nor praised.”).
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stark contrast to the Supreme Court’s elaborate conception, when this ninetyfour percent of defendants are convicted, no trial takes place, no jury is
empanelled, no witnesses are called much less confronted, and the judgment of
conviction is based almost entirely on self-incrimination by the defendant.
The complexity and costliness inherent in the Supreme Court’s conception
of procedural rights, then, have largely been accommodated within the volume
of our criminal justice system by creating a two-tiered system of criminal
justice: an elaborate level of protection for those few who stand trial but
minimal protection for the overwhelming majority who plead guilty. One
criticism which can be advanced regarding the Supreme Court’s treatment of
due process and criminal procedure generally, is that it has paid too little
attention to cost and complexity and the volume of offenses and offenders
processed by our criminal justice system. Another is that the Court has
focused its attention too narrowly on the few who go to trial and showed too
little concern for the overwhelming majority who plead guilty.
Such questions—whether our criminal justice system has been rendered
too difficult to reform or too complex to deal effectively with the volume of
offenses and offenders brought before American courts—though important,
ultimately go to the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s approach to due process. I
leave detailed examination of these issues for another day and following
Professor Israel’s lead, I focus in the following pages on the craft rather than
the ultimate wisdom of the Supreme Court’s due process methodology.
I have three reactions to offer in response to Professor Israel’s lecture. The
first is an observation contrasting the expansive exercise of judicial power
under the due process clause with the restriction of judicial power in other
areas of law which converge with the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure
jurisprudence to control the criminal justice system. This comparison helps in
understanding why the Supreme Court’s due process methodology suffers from
the two problems Professor Israel describes at the end of his lecture: (1)
unacknowledged departures from prior case law and (2) ambiguities and
inconsistencies among cases regarding the standards the Supreme Court has
offered in support of its interpretations of due process in criminal cases.10 The
second point deals with the Supreme Court’s failure to distinguish clearly
between rule and remedy leading to confusion about the scope of certain rules.
My third point is a theoretical one suggesting that the confusion and
complexity found in the Supreme Court’s due process methodology may partly
be explained by both a general failure to articulate clearly the purposes that
methodology seeks to serve and a particular failure to come to terms with a
non-instrumental approach to criminal procedure.

10. Israel, supra note 1, at 427-32.
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JUDICIAL LAWMAKING IN AN AGE OF LEGISLATION

As I followed Professor Israel’s story of the development of due process, I
was struck by the contrast between the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the
area of criminal procedure and roughly contemporaneous developments in
other areas of law critical to the resolution of criminal cases: substantive
criminal law, the law of sentencing and the law of evidence. In developing its
due process jurisprudence, the Supreme Court speaks as if it is applying rather
than making law. But the body of law falling under the rubric of due process is
so expansive and its textual grounding so minimal, the Court appears in
Professor Israel’s story to be making rather than applying law. The justices
appear to have treated the due process clause as a mandate to create a broad
constitutional common law of criminal procedure. This expansive use of
judicial power under due process, as well as other constitutional provisions, is
in marked contrast to the contraction of judicial power in substantive criminal
law, sentencing and evidence.
At the time the constitution was drafted, the job of defining criminal
offenses was firmly in the hands of the judiciary.11 A movement toward
codification started with the American Revolution and by the late 1800s was
well under way. Today, legislators have primary and virtually exclusive
authority regarding the creation of new offenses. Indeed, it is difficult in
recent decades to find an example of the prosecution of a common law crime
in either federal or state jurisdictions.12
The judiciary undoubtedly still plays a significant though often
controversial role in shaping the contours of the substantive criminal law
through interpreting statutes. Additionally, legislatures sometimes write
criminal statutes so vaguely that the task of defining one or more elements of
an offense shifts to the judiciary.13
Despite these qualifications, two things are clear. There has developed in
this country a broad consensus that the work of defining criminal offenses
should be done by legislators rather than judges. And though judges
nonetheless play a role in defining offenses, there has been a fundamental shift
in power from judges to legislators in defining crimes compared with the days
of common law crimes.
In recent years, one finds a similar though less dramatic restriction of
judicial power in the area of sentencing. As late as 1985, a federal judge
sentencing a criminal defendant exercised almost exclusive authority in

11. See Note, Common Law Crimes in the United States, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1332 (1947).
12. For one recent example of court approval of prosecution of a common law offense, see
People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994).
13. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-Lawmaking, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 5, 6-11 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?
110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 471-79 (1996).
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choosing a sentence from an often wide range established by the statute under
which the defendant had been convicted.14 In an armed bank robbery, for
example, the judge could choose any sentence from straight probation to
twenty-five years imprisonment.15 Driven largely by concern about disparities
among sentences under a system giving judges so much discretionary power, a
movement in favor of determinate sentencing sought to restrict that power. In
the federal system, that movement culminated in adoption of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, which greatly restrict the power of judges in
sentencing, limiting them to choosing sentences within ranges typically
marked by months rather than years. Sentencing guidelines have been adopted
in a number of states, though many are not as restrictive of judicial power as
the federal guidelines.16
The restriction of judicial power that has occurred in the area of sentencing
is not as dramatic or universal as the restriction one finds in the creation and
definition of offenses. Some states have refused to adopt a guidelines
approach,17 and the guidelines many states have adopted give greater power to
judges than the federal guidelines.18 Even under the federal guidelines, judges
have limited power to depart from the guidelines to impose either a more or
less severe sentence.19 Nonetheless, the past several decades have witnessed
an unmistakable movement toward confining the exercise of judicial power in
the area of sentencing.
The law of evidence provides another example of restriction of judicial
power. Like the common law of crimes, the law of evidence was created
largely by judges. Common law evidence rules were supplemented by
occasional statutes on topics such as business records until a trend toward
codification took hold in the twentieth century, culminating in the 1965
California Evidence Code and the 1975 Federal Rules of Evidence. Today
evidence law primarily takes the form of codes.20
Judges still control some areas of evidence law. Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, for example, privilege rules21 and some areas of impeachment22
have been left to common law development. Judges also still play an
14. For a description of federal sentencing practice before and after adoption of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, see NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
684-708 (3d. ed. 2000).
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
16. Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State Sentencing
Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 426 (2000).
17. Id. at 427.
18. Id. at 427-30.
19. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 14, 726-47.
20. Some states, such as Missouri, still utilize common law evidence rules.
21. FED. R. EVID. 501; see ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW 383-84 (1998).
22. There are, for example, no federal rules controlling impeachment for bias or capacity.
See PARK ET AL., supra note 21, at 459-67.
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important role interpreting evidence rules, and trial judges in particular clearly
exercise power in applying rules such as Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which
grants the trial judge considerable discretion in controlling the admission of
evidence through weighing probative value and need against dangers of
prejudice, confusion, and waste of time. Nonetheless, as in criminal law, there
has been a sea change in attitude in the law of evidence over the past century
about giving judges the power to create evidence rules.
The contrast between restriction of judicial power in the areas of
substantive criminal law, sentencing and evidence, and the expansion of
judicial power described in Professor Israel’s article is marked. As Professor
Israel has noted, constitutional standards created by the justices of the Supreme
Court have come to “constitute what is surely the most important single body
of law governing the [criminal justice] process.”23 It stands in marked contrast
not only to U.S. law on substantive crimes, sentencing, and evidence, but also
in contrast to European systems which are code based.24 Ironically, the period
typically viewed as the apogee of judicial lawmaking in the area of criminal
procedure, the 1960s and 1970s, coincided with the culmination of the
movement to remove evidentiary lawmaking from the judiciary—the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal Rules not only
codified the vast majority of federal evidence law, but also provided a catalyst
and model for restricting the power of judges over evidence law in many
states.
The movement toward legislation and away from common law was not
restricted to the areas of criminal law and evidence. Rather, the shift in lawmaking power from judges to legislators one finds in criminal law and
evidence are typical of a larger phenomenon, which has led to our current legal
culture being called “the age of statutes” 25 by Judge Guido Calabresi and “an
age of legislation” 26 by Justice Antonin Scalia.
Why this difference? Why do we deny judges power over defining
criminal offenses and evidence rules but grant them such power in the area of
criminal procedure? One response is that criminal procedure is an area with a
23. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
469 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter TREATISE].
24. PIZZI, supra note 6, at 158.
25. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982);
see also ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS xv (1997) (“We live in an age of statutes in which the nation’s
legislatures serve actively as the dominant institutions for determining public policy and
translating it into law.”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 17 (2000) (“[W]e live in a democracy, where today most of our law is made not
by judges in common law cases but by popularly elected legislators adopting statutes and by
administrative agencies promulgating rules and regulations.”).
26. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 13
(1997).
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much more substantial constitutional dimension than substantive criminal law
or evidence. Criminal procedure receives more attention in the constitution
than any subject other than the basic organization of the federal government.
But the importance of judge-made constitutional rules in the field of
criminal procedure is not simply a product of the number of constitutional
provisions devoted to criminal procedure. It is also a result of the Supreme
Court’s expansive interpretation of those provisions, particularly in the past
forty years. Why has our legal culture favored restriction of judicial power in
some areas relating to criminal justice but tolerated expansion in another?
Perhaps one finds in operation here a sort of law of dynamic homeostasis
maintaining a general balance of power between the branches of government.
As judicial power is curbed in one area, such as the creation of criminal
offenses, there is a compensating expansion of power in the creation of
criminal procedure rules. Another possible explanation is that we find
expansive judicial power more acceptable in creating new rules of criminal
procedure than in creating new crimes since the expansion of procedural
protections typically serves to protect the citizenry by restricting the imposition
of liability, while the creation of new crimes expands liability.
But what insight does this contrast offer to the craft problems highlighted
by Professor Israel at the end of his lecture? He points to two: (1)
unacknowledged departures from prior case law and (2) ambiguities and
inconsistencies among cases regarding the standards the Supreme Court has
offered in support of its interpretations of due process in criminal cases.27
These weaknesses are hardly unique to the Supreme Court’s treatment of
due process in criminal cases. One finds the same sort of problems, for
example, in the Supreme Court’s minimum contacts cases applying due
process to state exertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over defendants in civil
cases.28 The Supreme Court’s minimum contacts jurisprudence reflects a
gradual accumulation of a motley assortment of factors ranging from the
defendant’s conduct and mental state to the federal government’s foreign
policy interests.
Typically, new factors have been added without
acknowledgment or justification of departure from past practice and with little
if any attempt to integrate innovations with prior cases.
Nor are such weaknesses restricted to the work of the Supreme Court.
Rather, they are typical of judge-made common law. Professor Israel’s
complaints resonate with general criticism of judge made law made by
champions of codification in many areas of law. The common law of

27. Israel, supra note 1, at 427-32.
28. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed
Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 195-99 (1998).
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evidence, for example, has been characterized as “a growing, changing,
fractious and often contradictory body of precedents.”29
The unacknowledged departures from prior case law might be the result of
several different factors. One possibility is that the justices are simply unaware
of the existence of the prior cases they fail to acknowledge. The fact that the
corpus of Supreme Court case law devoted to due process has grown
increasingly voluminous and complex would be consistent with such an
explanation. Accessibility problems are typical of common law. Those who
favored abandoning the common law approach in favor of codification of
federal evidence law, for example, advanced the pragmatic argument that the
common law of evidence was too voluminous and complex to be accurately
found and understood by judges and lawyers in the midst of trials.30
But other factors make it implausible that the justices would be unaware of
relevant prior case law. The justices have more time and support for research
than a trial judge and in recent years have gained access to computerized
databases to aid in locating relevant prior cases. The justices also have the
luxury of being able to devote their time and energy primarily to legal issues,
as opposed to trial judges who must concern themselves with the resolution of
both legal and factual issues. Parties appearing before the Supreme Court have
typically had the opportunity to research the applicable precedents at both the
trial and appellate levels before briefing the Supreme Court. So one would
think the parties would do a good job pointing out relevant prior cases even if
the justices and their clerks had not found them on their own. The Supreme
Court also often has the advantage of opinions from lower courts, which have
researched the applicable case law.
A more plausible explanation for the problem of unacknowledged
departures from prior cases is that the justices are aware of the prior cases from
which they are departing but unwilling to openly acknowledge when they
abandon an established approach and create something new. Why might the
justices hesitate to be candid about this? First, the notion of fidelity to
precedent may prove a hindrance to candor about the justices creating new
legal rules. Second, the conceit that the justices are simply applying
constitutional text rather than creating new law may also be a barrier to candor.
Finally, the fact that the justices are operating in an age of legislation, a legal
29. PARK ET AL., supra note 21, at 425-29.
30. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE
AND PRACTICE 4 (“Making evidence law accessible is the main reason for the code that has
become the most influential body of American evidence law—the Federal Rules of Evidence.”);
Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the House Spec. Subcomm. on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws of the Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R., 93d Cong. 90 (1973) (testimony of Albert
Jenner) (“[T]he administration of justice in the federal courts is suffering seriously. A major
factor in this regard is the maelstrom of rules of evidence which must be presently ferreted out
and applied by federal judges.”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

THE CRAFT OF DUE PROCESS

485

culture increasingly opposed to judges creating law, may help explain their
reluctance to openly acknowledge active law making.
The problem of ambiguities and inconsistencies between cases might also
be explained in several ways. Professor Israel’s ambition in seeking to tell the
story of due process over a period of almost 120 years brings to mind a
methodological divide I read of recently among geologists.31 There now exist
two quite different approaches to understanding the earth’s history and
structure. Traditional geologists examine the earth’s surface at close range.
They look at particular sections of the earth’s surface, scrutinizing the details
of particular formations through field-work and by putting hammer to rock. A
new breed of geologist trained in physics, though, has recently brought to the
field a set of techniques radically different from those of the traditional
geologist. Using satellite maps to examine huge sections of the globe at long
range, these new geologists develop complicated mathematical models and
universal laws on a much grander scale than traditional geologists.
Like the earth’s surface, the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence is
the product of a gradual, case-by-case process of accretion.32 Lawyers, judges
and most academics, as Professor Israel points out in his article,33 consume the
Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence the same way it is produced. Like
traditional geologists, they work with it in discrete chunks, examining at close
range individual cases, such as Chambers v. Mississippi34 on the constitutional
dimension of excluding hearsay offered by a criminal defendant, or clusters of
cases dealing with particular issues, such as the line of cases from Brady v.
Maryland35 through Strickler v. Greene36 on prosecutorial disclosure of
exculpatory evidence.
By contrast, Professor Israel adopts in his article a perspective on the
Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence that is the scholarly equivalent of
the physicist-geologist’s view of the earth’s surface. He makes us look at the
big picture, giving us a panoramic view across a wide range of criminal
procedure issues from investigation to sentencing and covering more than a
century of the Supreme Court’s work.
Narrow framing, focusing one’s attention on a particular case or cluster of
cases, reveals certain types of flaws in the Supreme Court’s work, such as lack
of logical force or clarity in a particular opinion or inconsistencies within
31. See James Glanz, Physicists Invading Geologists’ Turf, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999, at
F1.
32. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME ix (1999) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court is part of a
long historical tradition. Anglo-American courts often take small rather than large steps,
bracketing the hardest and most divisive issues.”).
33. Israel, supra note 1, at 305.
34. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
35. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
36. 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
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particular lines of cases relating to a particular subject. But narrow framing
insulates us from both the insights and challenges found in the larger story of
due process.
Inconsistencies and ambiguities of the sort Professor Israel points out
emerge more clearly when one adopts the sort of broad framing found in
Professor Israel’s article. Though the work of the Supreme Court is often
made up of issues of national importance, its method of making law, like the
common law method generally, naturally inclines the justices toward narrow
framing. Developing legal principles in the context of resolving particular
cases, as judges do, naturally runs the risk of over-attention to doing justice in
the particular case and inattention to whether the resolution of that case is
consistent with prior case law. As Professor Israel points out, most academics
criticizing the Court’s work also adopt this sort of narrow framing, so the
academic literature has not exerted much corrective leverage on the Court.
Since the weaknesses Professor Israel points out are typical of judge-made
law, it is probably unrealistic to think that those weaknesses will change as
long as the Court’s due process jurisprudence continues to be made by judges
through a common law process. Perhaps, though, Professor Israel’s article and
others prompted by it adopting a similar broad viewpoint will increase the
Court’s awareness of these problems and prompt improvement.
II. DISTINGUISHING RULE FROM REMEDY
A recurring craft problem which causes confusion in the Supreme Court’s
due process and other criminal procedure cases is failure clearly to distinguish
rule from remedy. Appellate courts often need to treat the question of whether
a rule was violated separately from what steps, if any, the court should take
under the circumstances of a particular case to remedy a violation. In
assessing whether reversal of a trial court judgment and the granting of a new
trial are appropriate remedies, appellate courts often look to the impact of a
rule violation on the outcome of the case.37
Assume, for example, an appellate court is confronted with a claim that a
trial court’s admission of a criminal defendant’s prior criminal record violated
the ban on character evidence.38 If the appellate court decides the character
rule was in fact violated, it would not automatically reverse the trial court’s
judgment and grant a new trial. But if the erroneously admitted evidence

37. For examples of rules codifying such outcome oriented appellate review standards, see
FED. R. EVID. 103(a); FED. R. CIV. PRO. 61; FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 52(a). For an account of the
rationale and development of such rules, see CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, 441-43 (2d. ed. 1995).
38. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
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affected the outcome of the trial, the appellate court typically would reverse
and grant a new trial.39
In the law of evidence, the Supreme Court and other appellate courts
routinely partition their analysis of rule violation from their analysis of an
appropriate remedy without great difficulty. But the Supreme Court often fails
to maintain that distinction in constitutional criminal procedure. At one time it
was thought that any constitutional error required reversal.40 But in Chapman
v. California,41 the Supreme Court held that the harmless error doctrine may
apply even to constitutional errors. Since Chapman, the Supreme Court has at
times collapsed the questions of rule violation and appropriate remedy into a
single analysis and in doing so created confusion.
A prime example of this confusion can be found in the line of Supreme
Court due process cases dealing with prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory
evidence. The first of these cases was Brady v. Maryland,42 a 1963 case in
which the Court held that the prosecutor has a due process obligation to
disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defense. In Brady, the Court did
not define the term material. One plausible reading of Brady is that the Court
used the term material in a broad sense, as a synonym for relevance, a common
meaning in the law of evidence. Under this broad interpretation, the
prosecutor would need to disclose all relevant exculpatory evidence. But it is
also possible to interpret Brady as suggesting a narrow interpretation of the
term material as including only items of exculpatory evidence which have
particularly high probative value.
Thirteen years later, the Supreme Court dealt with this ambiguity about the
scope of the Brady disclosure rule by adopting a two-tiered approach in United
States v. Agurs.43 If the defense specifically requested an item, the materiality
standard was broad. The prosecutor was required to turn over anything that
might have affected the outcome. Without a specific request, a narrower
standard applied. The prosecutor was required to turn such items over only if
they would have created reasonable doubt. Nine years later, in United States v.
Bagley, the Supreme Court abandoned the two-tiered Agurs approach to
materiality in favor of exclusive use of a narrow test.44 Under Bagley,
prosecutors must disclose exculpatory evidence only “if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.”45
39. See PARK ET AL., supra note 21, at 542-47.
40. Id. at 551 (“Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chapman v. California, it was
thought that constitutional errors were always grounds for reversal.”).
41. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
42. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
43. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
44. 473 U.S. 667, 681-84 (1985).
45. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
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In the course of roughly twenty years, then, the Supreme Court went from
failing to define materiality, to simultaneously embracing both broad and
narrow definitions of materiality in a bifurcated analysis, to what appears in
Bagley to be a single, narrow definition. In the course of these various twists
and turns, it collapsed two different inquiries, the scope of a defendant’s right
to receive exculpatory information and whether a violation of that right
mandates reversal and a new trial. These developments have had a number of
unhappy consequences.
One is the awkwardness of the phrasing of the Brady rule found in Bagley.
It is phrased as an ex post rule which looks back at a finished trial, asking what
“would have been different” at the trial if the exculpatory evidence had been
disclosed. This makes sense for a remedy rule, which is typically applied
retrospectively by an appellate court after the trial has been concluded. But this
phrasing makes no sense as a rule of disclosure, which is typically applied
prospectively by a prosecutor before trial. A prosecutor deciding whether or
not to disclose exculpatory evidence before trial obviously cannot look back at
a trial that has yet to take place.
Even if one recasts the Bagley materiality standard as an ex ante rule
requiring prediction of whether the Brady information would affect the
outcome of an upcoming trial, practical application problems remain. Imagine
a pre-trial defense motion seeking certain information under the Brady rule, to
which the prosecution responds by asserting that the requested information
does not meet the Bagley materiality test. Assume the judge agrees to review
the disputed information in camera to determine whether it is material. How
can the judge apply the Bagley materiality test and predict how the requested
information will affect the outcome of the trial without detailed knowledge of
the evidence which will be introduced at trial by both the prosecution and
defense? The judge is unlikely to have such detailed knowledge of the
evidence prior to trial. By contrast, a judge without detailed knowledge of the
other evidence could apply prior to trial a test that casts materiality simply in
terms of probative value relative to an important issue in the case.
A third problem is lingering ambiguity about the scope of the disclosure
rule, ample evidence of which is found in Strickler v. Greene,46 the Court’s
most recent encounter with the Brady disclosure rule. Consider the following
passage from Justice Stevens’ opinion in Strickler:
[The prosecutor’s] special status explains both the basis for the prosecution’s
broad duty of disclosure and our conclusion that not every violation of that
duty necessarily establishes that the outcome was unjust. Thus the term
“Brady violation” is sometimes used to refer to any breach of the broad
obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence—that is, to any suppression of socalled “Brady material”—although, strictly speaking, there is never a real

46. 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
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“Brady violation” unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a
reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a
different verdict.47

The Supreme Court in Strickler reaffirmed Bagley’s narrow materiality
standard. Nonetheless, Justice Stevens refers twice here to the prosecutor’s
“broad” disclosure duty and obligation as if the broad interpretation of
materiality were still viable. He attempts to clarify the ambiguity between the
broad and narrow views of materiality by resorting to the adjectives “so called”
and “real.” A “so called” Brady violation is failure to disclose evidence that
satisfies the broad materiality standard. A “real” Brady violation is failure to
disclose evidence that would probably have changed the outcome.
Distinguishing more effectively and consistently between rule and remedy
would help ameliorate such confusion in the Brady area and in other areas of
due process as well.
III. METHODOLOGY IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE
Professor Israel focuses his lecture on the Supreme Court’s interpretative
guidelines and the use of those guidelines in resolving issues presented in
particular due process cases. What policies, though, drive the selection of
these guidelines? One source of confusion and incoherence in the Supreme
Court’s due process cases is the Court’s failure to address and to articulate the
purposes that methodology seeks to serve.
The purposes of substantive criminal law have been and continue to be the
subject of extensive examination and vigorous debate. Justifications such as
retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation, for example, provide the axes
around which academic and public debate revolves on many criminal justice
issues, such as imposition of the death penalty. But the purposes of criminal
procedure, by contrast, have not received much attention. Rather, they have
typically been treated as “obvious and noncontroversial.”48 Professor Peter
Arenella has described “a glaring deficiency in criminal justice scholarship: the
failure to identify the functions served by American criminal procedure.”49 In
attempting to assess and compare the work of the Warren and Burger Courts in
the area of criminal procedure, Professor Arenella concludes that “[w]ithout a
clearer understanding of criminal procedure’s functions, we cannot begin to

47. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281 (citations omitted).
48. Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 185-86 (1983) (“What functions are
served by criminal procedure? For the most part, American criminal justice scholarship has
assumed that the answers to this question are obvious and noncontroversial.”).
49. Id. at 247.
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make any useful comparison of the two Courts’ approaches to criminal
procedure.”50
This lack of close attention to the purposes of criminal procedure among
legal academics is mirrored in the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure
opinions, including those on due process. Rarely does the Court address the
ultimate purposes of due process in particular or criminal procedure in general.
When the Court does mention a justification or purpose of a particular criminal
procedure right, it does so in passing and with cursory treatment at best.
Professor Arenella’s point that it is difficult to make sense of the Warren and
Burger Courts’ criminal procedure legacies without first articulating the
purposes criminal procedure seeks to serve is equally valid when it comes to
making sense of the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence.
Looking at the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence from the broad
perspective offered in Professor Israel’s article, I felt a bit as I did when I once
took a ride in a hot air balloon. The increasingly dramatic view of the
surrounding landscape revealed as the balloon rose higher and higher gave me
an uneasy combination of exhilaration and nausea. The broad expanse of the
Supreme Court’s due process methodology revealed in the course of reading
Professor Israel’s article produced a similar ambivalence. Many of the themes
that emerge in the history of the Supreme Court’s due process methodology are
quite interesting. But the inconsistencies and confusion in methodology
reminded me of Lawrence Friedman’s description of the evolution of due
process as being characterized by “zigs and zags and lurches, like a drunk
trying to walk a straight line.”51 The Supreme Court’s failure to focus on and
articulate where it has been headed in its journey of developing the meaning of
due process in modern American criminal procedure may help explain these
“zigs and zags and lurches.”
One question the Court has neglected in its general failure to examine and
articulate the purposes of criminal procedure is whether criminal procedure
rules such as the right to due process are supported by any non-instrumental
justification. Instrumental and non-instrumental approaches to justifying legal
rules are found in many areas of law. The instrumental view is prospective; it
focuses on the interests of society rather than on the rights or responsibilities of
individuals and relies on instrumental rather than moral criteria.52 The noninstrumental view, in contrast, is retrospective; it focuses on the rights and
responsibilities of individuals and relies on moral rather than instrumental
criteria.53

50.
51.
(1993).
52.
53.

Id. at 248.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 56
McMunigal, supra note 28, at 199.
Id. at 200.
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These differences are readily apparent in criminal law and torts. An
instrumental approach to criminal law might see criminal punishment as an
instrument for advancing the socially-useful goal of reducing future crime
through deterrence, rehabilitation or incapacitation.54 A non-instrumental view
of criminal law often labeled “just deserts” sees criminals as being properly
punished because they deserve it based on past wrongdoing, not because it will
provide any future benefit to society.55 An instrumental approach might see
tort law as a means for advancing the collective social goals of deterrence or
cost-spreading.56 A non-instrumental view often called “corrective justice,” by
contrast, looks to the respective moral rights and responsibilities of individual
actors to determine the distribution of tort liability.57
Is there an analog in criminal procedure to the “just deserts” approach to
criminal law and the “corrective justice” approach to torts? Professor George
Fletcher has written “[t]he most common mode of moral reasoning in the
Anglo-American tradition is cost/benefit analysis—the ‘balancing’ of
competing advantages and disadvantages of adopting particular courses of
action. As the argument goes, all legal decisions (by individuals as well as
courts) should be judged according to their consequences.”58 The tendency
toward instrumental thinking is particularly strong in the area of procedure,
often viewed as simply a means for enforcing the rights and obligations found
in substantive law.59 Professor Israel’s treatise, for example, begins by
defining criminal procedure as “ the law governing that series of procedures
through which the substantive criminal law is enforced.”60
In thinking about criminal procedure, then, we naturally tend to gravitate
toward justifying and measuring procedural rights in instrumental terms, by
assessing the consequences of applying or failing to apply those rights on
objectives such as enforcing substantive criminal law, discovering historical
truth, minimizing factual errors, cost, efficiency, deterring police misconduct
or maintaining public respect for the criminal justice system. But is the
justification for criminal procedure rights in general and due process in
54. See, e.g., Johannes Andeneas, Deterrence, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
591, 592 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
55. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND EMOTIONS 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
56. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW (1987).
57. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part I, 1
LAW & PHIL. 371 (1982).
58. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 144 (1996).
59. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1203-04 (6th ed. 1990) (defining procedure as
“the mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced”); BRYAN A. GARNER, A
DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 697 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that “[p]rocedural law . . .
consists of the rules by which one establishes one’s rights, duties, liberties, and powers”).
60. 1 TREATISE, supra note 23, at 5.
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particular exclusively instrumental? Do we give defendants due process only
because of the useful consequences it may produce, such as a more accurate
determination of factual guilt? Or is due process in part accorded to individual
defendants based on a moral intuition that defendants deserve certain
procedural rights, that certain types of process are due to individuals
threatened by the government with loss of liberty or life through imposition of
a criminal sanction apart from whatever socially useful consequences such
process produces? The Supreme Court’s lack of attention to the underlying
purposes of criminal procedure make it difficult to answer this question. The
Court’s frequent emphasis on results and, in particular, on the factual accuracy
of the determination of guilt, suggest a negative answer to this question. But
other aspects of the Court’s work, such as its exemption of certain cases from
harmless error analysis, may be read as consistent with non-instrumental
reasoning.
The Supreme Court’s failure to address the purposes of criminal procedure
causes confusion because it masks the tensions which may arise among
different and at times competing purposes. Even if one adopts a strictly
utilitarian view of the purposes of criminal procedure, various utilitarian goals
can conflict. Cost and accuracy, for example, are perennially at odds.
Extensive appellate review, for example, may increase accuracy in terms of
fact determination and application of the law, but it increases cost. Limitations
on the amount and scope of appellate review represent a compromise between
these competing goals. By failing to address and articulate the purposes of
criminal procedure, the Court provides no means for recognizing and openly
resolving such tensions on a consistent, principled basis.
If one recognizes a non-utilitarian aspect to the purposes of criminal
procedure rules, the potential for conflict between utilitarian and non-utilitarian
values adds another potential source of tension to those which may already
arise among utilitarian goals. Again, an advantage of having the Supreme
Court address and articulate the purposes of criminal procedure would be to
force the Court to confront this tension and provide some means for resolving
it. Professor Paul Robinson has written about the need for developing mixed
theories in substantive criminal law to deal with such tensions. When such
conflicts occur,
ultimately a choice must be made to follow one purpose at the expense of
another. Yet, when faced with conflicting purposes, judges, legislators, and
sentencing-guideline drafters have no principle to guide that decision. In the
absence of a guiding principle, the choices made are at best inconsistent . . . .
At worst, the absence of a guiding principle fosters arbitrariness or prejudice.61

61. Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 NW.
U. L. REV. 19, 20 (1987) (citations omitted).
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Professor Robinson’s point about substantive criminal law is equally valid
when applied to the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure cases in general and
due process cases in particular. The Supreme Court’s failure to acknowledge,
much less provide guidance in resolving, such tensions in part explains the
inconsistency and ambiguity found in the Supreme Court’s due process
jurisprudence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Israel encourages us to use a wide lens in assessing the Supreme
Court’s due process jurisprudence. Doing so provides grounds for both
pessimism and optimism about improving the craft of due process in the
Court’s work. The fact that some of the flaws he identifies are typical of
common law process suggests there is little reason to be optimistic about
remedying those flaws as long as the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence continues
to develop through what is essentially a common law process. But the wide
lens Professor Israel’s article prompts us to use may help in remedying these
flaws by bringing them into clearer view for both the Court and its academic
critics.
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